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Abstract
Selective exposure to political news in social media in Indonesia is escalating along with the increasing polarization of
Indonesian people. This research aims to investigate: 1) differences in selective exposure to fake news content among
incumbent and opposition supporters; 2) the association between critical thinking ability and partisans’ selective exposure.
Repeated measures design was employed as the experiment design. Respondents were student activists of extra-campus
organizations with particular political ideologies, who have pro-incumbent or pro-opposition preference. Seventy-one
respondents were recruited, consisting of 34 incumbent (Jokowi) supporters and 37 opposition (Prabowo) supporters. Data
was analyzed using independent t-test, a paired sample t-test, and correlational analysis. Results show that the opposition
side was more inclined to demonstrate selective exposure by believing in fake news about their political enemy, compared
to the incumbent supporters. This is shown by their tendency to believe and spread discrediting news about their political
opponents rather than doing so for news which discredits their side. No association between critical thinking and partisan
selective exposure was found. The implication of these results is that the critical point in debiasing is not necessarily
predicated merely on analytical thinking ability but might also rest on one’s ability to think open-mindedly.

Selective Exposure Partisan pada Konten-konten Berita Palsu
Abstrak
Fenomena terjadinya selective exposure atas berita-berita politik di media sosial di Indonesia semakin menguat seiring
tajamnya polarisasi di antara masyarakat di Indonesia. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menginvestigasi: 1) perbedaan
selective exposure atas konten berita palsu pada pendukung presiden petahana dan oposisi; 2) asosiasi antara
kemampuan berpikir kritis dengan selective exposure pada partisan pendukung kandidat presiden. Repeated measures
design digunakan sebagai desain eksperimen. Responden merupakan aktivis organisasi mahasiswa ekstra kampus yang
memiliki ideologi politik tertentu dan memiliki preferensi pro terhadap petahana atau pro terhadap oposisi. Didapatkan
71 responden yang terdiri dari 34 pendukung petahana (Jokowi) dan 37 pendukung oposisi (Prabowo). Analisis data
dilakukan dengan menggunakan independent t-test, paired sample t-test, dan analisis korelasi. Hasil analisis data
mengindikasikan pendukung oposisi cenderung menunjukkan adanya selective exposure dengan mempercayai berita
palsu atas lawan politik dibandingkan pada kubu pendukung petahana. Hal ini ditunjukkan dengan tendensi untuk
percaya dan menyebarkan berita yang mendiskreditkan lawan politiknya dibandingkan dengan berita yang
mendiskreditkan kubu yang didukungnya. Tidak terdapat asosiasi antara berpikir kritis dengan selective exposure pada
partisan. Implikasi hasil ini adalah titik kritis pada debiasing bukan semata pada kemampuan berpikir analitik namun
dimungkinkan pada kemampuan berpikir secara lebih terbuka.
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1. Introduction

existing beliefs, and to avoid unwanted news (Frey,
1986; Hart, Albarracín, Eagly, Brechan, Lindberg, &
Merrill, 2009; Metzger, Hartsell, & Flanagin, 2015;
Hogg & Vaughan, 2017). In relation to that, the selective
exposure hypothesis explains that an individual tends to

Research on selective exposure to news coverage shows
a relatively consistent finding that individuals tend to
only select and validate news which confirms their
6
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avoid dissonant information. This occurs in three subprocesses (Klapper, 1960): 1) selective exposure, i.e.,
they avoid communicating with anything that is
incongruent with their attitude; 2) selective perception,
i.e., when confronted with unpleasant things, they will
ignore this information or make it conform with their
initial opinion; and 3) selective retention, i.e., tending to
forget attitude-incongruent information.
In the political years ahead of the presidential election in
Indonesia, selective exposure of political news was
indicated by the increasing spread of news which
demonstrated polarization between supporters of the
presidential candidates. Since the 2014 election, people
have been divided into two heavily polarized groups of
supporters. Mietzner (2015) states, “no election since the
end of authoritarianism had presented such stark
alternatives as Prabowo and Jokowi.” The two candidates
represent a battle between two populists, where Jokowi is
seen as the technocratic populist, and Prabowo is
regarded as the ultra-populist. Contention between the
two has been ongoing since the 2014 presidential
election, and was extended up until the 2017 Jakarta
gubernatorial election, in which Ahok, the then-governor
of Jakarta, was seen as a representation of support for
Jokowi, and Anies Baswedan, the current governor of
Jakarta, was seen as support for Prabowo (Lim, 2017).
As a consequence of the stark polarization, post-truth
political practices were born, characterized by an all-out
support from volunteers, “buzzers,” and celebrities, as
well as vulgar support from mainstream mass media
(Lim, 2017). Instead, of turning mainstream media or
social media into a platform to gather actual information,
die-hard supporters use the media as a place to express
“freedom to hate” by legitimating their own group and
excluding others (Lim, 2017). The practices of fake news
are carried out by delegitimating the other group based on
fake news, and the production and dissemination of fake
news has become a political business network, which was
uncovered by the Indonesian police (e.g., the Saracen
case) (Chan, 2017).
As in social polarization, partisans on each side believe
that any negative news concerning their group is an
offense against them. Partisans tend to only trust
information which supports things they already believe
in. They are inclined to ignore truth beyond their own
current belief system. A study by Knobloch-Westerwick
and Kleinman (2012) showed that those who were
affiliated with supporters of a party and wanted to win
in an election tended to show support for media that
confirmed their previously held beliefs. Barnidge et al.
(2017) demonstrated that partisans who were affiliated
with political activities were more likely to assume bias
in general mass media if it broadcast news incompatible
with their previously-held political beliefs, but regarded
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self-selected media or preferred media which was seen
as representing their views, as not biased.
Ditto et al. (2019) in their metanalysis noted that there is
no difference in bias among individual ideology
preferences when it comes to accepting political
information which supports their stance. It implies that
there is no political asymmetry between liberal and
conservative groups, which distinguishes them in terms
of selective exposure. Both groups are prone to bias.
Nickerson (1998) argued that confirmation bias in
selective exposure occurs in complex and ambiguous
situations, as political situations often are. This might be
due to failure to notice counterevidence or counterarguments of the pre-existing belief (Mercier & Sperber,
2011). In such situations, individuals only want to find
supporting opinions and evidence for their believed
claim and ignore negative arguments except to the
extent that they have prepared a refutation of the
negative argument (Mercier & Sperber, 2011).
A finding by Mahoney (1977), which was later
highlighted by Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom (1983) and
Nickerson (1998), reveals that scientists tend to remain
uncritical even toward fictional research which supports
dominant hypotheses in their discipline, as compared to
research findings which go against dominant hypotheses.
Shin and Thorson (2017) noted that, even during factchecking, partisans selectively choose news that supports
their candidate of choice and which discredits the
opponent. In the political context, it is analogous with
the behavior of partisans who react differently toward
fake news concerning political candidates that they
support, and candidates on the opposite side. Fake news
which defames the rival would be viewed favorably,
while news discrediting candidates on their own side
would be deemed as not credible.
In relation to the selective exposure phenomenon, one
popular and intuitive statement holds that analytical and
critical thinking can improve discernment of truth in the
media and reduce bias. Pennycook and Rand (2018)
said that, regardless of the group they belong to,
individuals with the ability to think analytically will be
more capable of distinguishing hoaxes from real news.
In critical thinking, individuals are asked to analyze
assumption and bias, to avoid oversimplification, to take
the interpretation of others into account, and to tolerate
ambiguity (Wade, 1995). Beyer (1995) also highlighted
that critical thinkers are those who are skeptical, openminded, value fair-mindedness, appreciate evidence and
reasoning, and are capable of taking account of different
points of view. Critical thinking ability is assumed to
improve awareness, so that one could avoid emotional
(Thagard, 2011) and irrational (Johnson & Blair, 2006)
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thinking, by deliberating and arguing in a correct
manner.
However, a contradiction to this intuitive view exists, in
which another study’s finding shows that bias is not
affected by critical thinking. Mercier and Sperber
(2011) explain that reliance on rationality can instead
trap an individual in a bias blind spot. Individuals will
look for arguments using their rationality to justify their
belief and behavior.
This research aims to study selective exposure to fake
news content among supporters of Jokowi as the
incumbent and of Prabowo as the opposition. In addition,
it will also investigate the role of critical thinking in
reducing selective exposure occurring among those
partisans. Partisans’ tendency to trace the source of fake
news information will also be a part of the observation
in this study. Fake news content of each candidate was
intentionally chosen due to the voters’ proclivity for
getting stuck in ultimate attribution error and
correspondence bias, when they focus on and exaggerate
mistakes of the opposing side (Hogg & Vaughan, 2017).
Also, people are more likely to be sensitive to negative
information than positive information (Fiske, 1980;
Hogg & Vaughan, 2017)
This research posits several hypotheses and research
questions, as follows: H1. There are response differences
among partisans where supporters of both candidates
will tend: (a) to believe and to spread fake news content
concerning the opposite side; (b) not to believe or
spread fake news content concerning the side that they
support. H2. Critical thinking is correlated with the
belief in fake news and tendency to spread fake news.
RQ1. Will partisans have the tendency to trace the
source of the fake news?

2. Methods
Instruments. Selective exposure is seen as the tendency
to favor and validate news which supports existing
beliefs, and in this case, is the participants’ tendency to
believe in negative news which discredits the opponent
and not to believe negative news that dishonors the
candidate they support. Additionally, the degree of
proclivity for spreading news which supports their
political preference will also be measured, in the sense
that if participants’ political preference says that the
opposing candidate is bad, they will be more likely to
spread the negative news. Participants were asked to
choose one of two options: whether to support Jokowi
(incumbent president) or Prabowo (opposition leader).
Operationally, participants were given six news links,
comprising three links of fake news defaming the
opposition side (i.e., Prabowo), and another three links
of news discrediting the incumbent (i.e., Jokowi). They
Makara Hubs-Asia

were then asked to respond to each link. The questions
presented for each link were: 1) Is this news reliable?
Give your rating from 1 to 9 (1 = very unreliable and 9 =
very reliable); 2) Please give your rating from 1 to 9, on
how important is it for this news to be spread and known
to the public? (1 = very unimportant for the public to
know about it and 9 = very important for the public to
know about it). Our news item can be found in
Supplementary Materials (SM).
Critical thinking ability was measured using an
instrument formulated by Fajrianthi, Hendriyani, and
Septarini (2016). This test measures the actual ability of
general critical thinking, consisting of 37 items which
comprise inference, recognition of assumption, deduction,
interpretation, and evaluation aspects. Any correct answer
to each item gives a score of 1 and any false answer gives
a 0 score. If participants answer all questions correctly, a
maximum score of 37 will be attained. Estimation of the
internal reliability of this test using the KR-20 formula
resulted in a coefficient of 0.57.
Data on fake news source tracing was obtained through
an observation checklist in which a research assistant
recorded if participants tracked the source of information
by browsing on the link of each item of fake news. If
they accessed the available link of any fake news, a
score of 1 would be given, and if they did not, a score of
0 was given. The maximum score that participants could
possibly attain if they accessed the link to the news
discrediting the incumbent was 3, and likewise with the
criteria applied browsing on links of the news concerning
the opposition party. If participants did not access the
links at all, a 0 score would be given.
Design and Participants. Repeated measures design
was employed as the research design, in which each
participant, regardless of their affiliation and political
preference, would receive the same treatment related to
fake news. They would be exposed to fake news content
concerning the candidate they supported and fake news
content about the opposing party.
The variables being studied in this research were:
selective exposure (dependent variable), manifested in
two dimensions, namely belief and the tendency to spread
fake news content to the public; presidential candidate
preference, where participants indicated their support for
the incumbent (Jokowi) or the opposition (Prabowo)
(independent variable); and critical thinking ability
(independent variable). Demographic data included were
age, gender, political party preference, affiliation with
student organization, and time spent online per day.
Recruitment of participants was conducted through
snowballing. Inclusion criteria are politically active
university students, preferring either Jokowi as the
incumbent, or Prabowo as the opposition candidate for
July 2019 ½Vol. 23 ½ No. 1
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the presidential candidate, and evidence of joining extracampus student organizations with a political ideology.
The names of the extra-campus organizations are
classified. 25.4% of participants joined a puritan Islamic
extra-campus organization, 32.4% joined a moderate
Islamic organization, 40.8% were members of a
nationalist Islamic organization, and the rest, 1.4%,
joined a nationalist organization.
Data was collected between October 1st and November
15th of 2017, from 78 respondents who were members
of extra-campus organizations in one public university in
Surabaya. Eight respondents were excluded from analysis
because the omitted to respond to some crucial items.
Out of 71 analyzed respondents, 62% were males and the
other 38 % were females. The age of respondents ranged
from 18 to 23 years old (M = 20.49, SD = 1.06). All
respondents were Muslim and students in bachelor
programs in a public university in Surabaya. Thirty-four
(47.9%) respondents were Jokowi supporters, while the
remaining 37 (52.1%) respondents, were Prabowo
supporters. 45.1% of respondents spent more than four
hours a day online, 23.9% spent 3–4 hours a day online,
18.3% spent 2–3 hours a day, and the remainder spent
fewer than two hours online per day.
All respondents identified with Islam. 63.4% reported
religious nationalism as their preferred ideology, 14.1%
reported being nationalistic, 8.5% wanted a nation based
on religious law, 7% claimed to be a democratic
socialist, and 1% chose not to say. 23.9% claimed that
their interest was accommodated by PKS (the Prosperous
Justice Party), 15.5% by PKB (the National Awakening
Party), 8.5% by PDIP (the Indonesian Democratic Party
of Struggle), 8.5% by PAN (the National Mandate
Party), and the other 11.2% was spread among other
parties (e.g., PPP, Gerindra, PBB, Nasdem, Partai
Demoktrat, and others), while the rest, 32.4%, preferred
not to say.
The majority of the incumbent’s supporters did not
access the three links to fake news about the opposition
side (88.2%), nor did they access all links to fake news,
discrediting the incumbent that they supported (88.2%).
Only four out of 34 supporters of the incumbent accessed
the provided links. The majority of the opposition
supporters demonstrated similar behavior, where only
three out of 37 participants accessed the links to fake
news of the incumbent side, meaning 91.9% of
participants did not access the links at all. Only two people
of the opposition side accessed the links to fake news
about their side, meaning the other 94.6%of them did not
access the link to fake news concerning their own side.
Based on a hypothetical norm, critical thinking ability
was classified into three categories, namely: low (x ≤
12.34), moderate (12.34 < x ≤ 24.66), and high (x >
24.66). Twenty-eight respondents were identified as
Makara Hubs-Asia
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having a high level of critical thinking ability, while 43
of them had a moderate level of critical thinking ability.
Based on the result of an independent sample t-test, both
the incumbent side (M = 24.08; SD = 3.44) and the
opposition side (M = 22.86; SD = 3.18) are on the same
level of critical thinking ability (t (69) = 1.54, p = 0.127,
Cohen’s d = 0.36).
Research Procedure. The experiment was conducted
individually, in which one participant would fill out the
questionnaire in the presence of a research assistant at
an agreed time. Participation was voluntary. A number
of key contact persons affiliated with extra-campus
student organizations were contacted and informed
about the research. They were also offered the chance to
join the research, by recommending some of their
organization members. The experiment was conducted
based on an agreement between research assistants and
participants. Data collection was paper based. This
research comprised three steps which were carried out
consecutively at one time.
Step 1. Before starting the experiment, participants were
informed about the procedure of the research and filled
out a participation consent form.
Step 2. Partisans filled out demographic data and a
questionnaire about presidential preference and were
then asked to take the critical thinking ability test. This
step took about 20 to 30 minutes.
Step 3. In relation to selective exposure, partisans were
asked to respond to some news items, as follows: 1)
Partisans read six headlines containing fake news about
the incumbent and the opposition side, along with a
preview of the news and the respective links to access
the full articles of each headline. Provision of the links
is expected to be a trigger for participants to trace the
source of the news by browsing on the provided link.
The research assistant would then fill out a checklist on
whether participants had accessed the link of each news
items using their smartphone; 2) Participants rated the
degree to which they found each news item trustworthy
from 1 to 9 (1 = very unreliable and 9 = very reliable);
3) They responded to an instruction saying “please rate
from 1 to 9 how important it is for this news to be
spread and known by the public? (1 = very unimportant
for the public to know about it and 9 = very important
for the public to know about it).” This step took from
two to five minutes.

3. Results
To test Hypothesis 1, an independent sample t-test and
paired sample t-test were conducted. The objective of
these two analyses is to find any between-group and
within-group difference in responding to fake news
July 2019 ½Vol. 23 ½ No. 1
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content. Meanwhile, to test the second hypothesis,
Pearson’s correlational analysis was carried out.
Table 1 shows the statistical result of independent
sample t-test, comparing the incumbent side and the
opposition side in terms of the type of fake news.
Meanwhile, Table 2 depicts the tendency that each side
had in responding to fake news, regarding the side they
supported and the opposing side. Based on the
independent sample t-test (Table 1), incumbent supporters
were found, more so than the opposition, to show trust
in fake news discrediting the opposition side (t (69) =
3.32; p < 0.01, d = 0.78). Also, opposition supporters, as
compared to the incumbent group, were more likely to
believe fake news that dishonors the incumbent (t (69) =
−2.31; p < 0.05, d = 0.54) (see Figure 1). However,
based on the result of paired sample t-tests (Table 2),
the incumbent supporters were found to be less likely to
demonstrate meaningful response change in their trust
toward fake news both concerning the opposition or the
incumbent (t (33) = 0.29, p = 0.77, d = 0.044). Unlike
their counterparts, the opposition supporters showed a
difference in responding to fake news, in which they
tended to demonstrate trust in fake news regarding their

opponent (i.e., the incumbent), compared with fake
news about their own side (t (36) = −5.62, p < 0.01, d =
0.929) (see Figure 1).
Similar patterns are also found in partisans’ tendency to
spread fake news content. Based on an independent
sample t-test (Table 1), the result, prima facie, shows
that the tendency to spread anti-opposition fake news
was higher in incumbent supporters than the opposition
counterpart (t (69) = 2.35; p < 0.05, d = 0.56) (see
Figure 2). Proclivity to spread anti-incumbent fake news
was similarly demonstrated more by the opposition
supporters, as compared to the incumbent group (t (69)
= −2.10; p < 0.05, d = 0.50). Looking into more detail
with paired sample t-tests (Table 2), the incumbent
supporter group tended to show no significant response
difference pertaining to the tendency to spread all types
of fake news (t (33) = 0.12, p = 0.90, d = 0.022). In
contrast, the opposition supporters showed a stark
difference in responding to different types of fake news,
where they were more inclined to spread fake news that
discredited the rival (i.e., the incumbent), compared to
the fake news of their own side (opposition) (t (36) =
−4.68, p < 0.01, d = 0.774) (see Figure 2).

Table 1. The Partisan Differences in Trusting and Tendency to Spread Fake News
df

Mean of the
incumbent
supporter

SD

Trust anti-opposition fake news

69

4.54

1.38

Trust anti-incumbent fake news

69

4.48

Tendency to spread antiopposition fake news

69

Tendency to spread antiincumbent fake news

69

Dimensions

Mean of the
opposition
supporter

SD

t

p

Cohens’
d

3.40

1.51

3.31

0.001

0.78

1.76

5.41

1.62

-2.31

0.023

0.54

4.56

1.63

3.61

1.76

2.35

0.021

0.56

4.53

1.86

5.44

1.73

-2.10

0.039

0.50

*p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Table 2. The Partisan Comparisons in Favor of and Against the Fake News
Paired Differences
95% CI of
Difference
Mean
SD
Lo
Up
Trust
Incumbent
supporters

Tendency
to spread

Trust
Opposition Tendency
supporters to spread

Makara Hubs-Asia

t

df

p

Cohen’s d

Fake news

0.06

1.37

-0.41

0.54

0.29

33

0.77

0.044

Fake news

0.02

1.35

-0.44

0.50

0.12

33

0.90

0.022

Fake news

-2.0

2.17

-2.73

-1.28

-5.62

36

0.00

0.929

Fake news

-1.82

2.37

-2.62

-1.03

-4.68

36

0.00

0.774
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10.00
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10.00
53
38
69
8.00

Trust Fake News Anti Incumbent

Trust Fake News Anti Opposition

8.00

6.00

4.00

6.00

4.00

2.00

2.00

0.00

0.00
Incumbent

Opposition

Incumbent

Supporters

Opposition

Supporters

Figure 1. Group Comparison to Trust Each Fake News Story
10.00

Tendency to Spread Fake News Anti Incumbent

Tendency to Spread Fake News Anti Opposition

10.00

8.00

6.00

4.00

2.00

0.00

8.00

6.00

4.00

2.00

0.00
Incumbent

Opposition

Supporters

Incumbent

Opposition

Supporters

Figure 2. Group Comparison to Spread Each Fake News Story
Based on the data in Table 2 above, the incumbent side
tended to respond similarly to all fake news (to both
those items regarding the opposition and the incumbent),
as compared to the opposition group. The opposition
showed a contrasting response toward fake news, based
on their presidential preference (see Figure 3). They
tended to trust fake news concerning their political
opponent more than they did fake news which
discredited the candidate they supported. It implies that
H1a and H1b are partially accepted because both have
Makara Hubs-Asia

only been confirmed in the opposition group, and not on
the incumbent group.
To test Hypothesis 2, a Pearson’s correlational analysis
was conducted (see Table 3). The result shows no
significant correlation between critical thinking and
trust in fake news among the incumbent supporters,
either in terms of anti-opposition fake news (r anti
opposition = −0.21, p > 0.05) or of anti-incumbent ones
(r anti-incumbent = −0.089, p > 0.05). A similar pattern
July 2019 ½Vol. 23 ½ No. 1
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Incumbent
Supporters

Opposition
Supporters

was also demonstrated by the opposition group, among
whom critical thinking was not found to correlate
significantly with trust in fake news (r anti opposition =
0.199, p > 0.05; r anti-incumbent = −0.246, p > 0.05).
Similarly, the case with tendency to spread fake news,
was not markedly correlated with critical thinking, both
in the incumbent supporters (r anti opposition = −0.220,
p > 0.05; r anti opposition = −0.070, p > 0.05) and the
opposition counterpart (r anti opposition = 0.283, p >

0.05; r anti-incumbent = −0.278, p > 0.05). These show
that H2 is not confirmed.
Consistency in tracing information was found between
the incumbent and opposition groups (see Table 4). In
terms of anti-opposition fake news, both groups of
supporters did not trace the sources of information (t
(69) = 0.58; p < 0.05, d = 1.41). Neither the opposition
group nor the incumbent counterpart traced the sources
of information pertaining to anti-incumbent fake news (t
(69) = 0.57; p < 0.05, d = 1.39).

5.44

Tendency to spread

3.61
5.41

Trust News

3.40

Tendency to spread

4.53
4.56

Trust News

4.48
4.54
0.00

1.00

2.00

Fake News Anti Incumbent

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

Fake News Anti Opposition

Figure 3. Each Partisan Comparison in Favor of or Against Fake News
Table 3. Correlation Matrix between Critical Thinking, Trust, and Tendency to Spread Fake News
Trust News
Critical
thinking

Incumbent
supporters

Critical
thinking

Opposition
supporters

Critical
thinking

Fake news
Anti Opposition

Tendency to spread

Fake news
Anti Incumbent

Fake news Anti
Opposition

Fake news Anti
Incumbent

1

−0.21

−0.089

−0.220

−0.070

1

0.199

−0.246

0.283

−0.278

Table 4. The Partisan Differences in Browsing the Source of Information

Dimensions

df

Mean of
incumbent
supporters

SD

Mean of
opposition
supporters

S
D

T

p

Cohens’ d

Browse the source fake
news anti-opposition

69

0.26

0.79

0.16

0.68

0.58

0.561

1.41

Browse the source fake
news anti-incumbent

69

0.29

0.83

0.18

0.70

0.57

0.567

1.39

*p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001
Makara Hubs-Asia
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4. Discussion
Results show that hypotheses regarding a selective
exposure tendency on each side are partially confirmed.
Difference in trust (H1a) and tendency to spread (H1b)
each type of fake news content is accounted for more by
stark differences among the opposition support, compared
to the incumbent supporters. The opposition group had a
markedly higher tendency to trust and spread news
content which discredits their political opponents, than
to do so for the fake news content that dishonors the
side they support. On the other hand, this was not
observed in the incumbent group, where pro-incumbent
partisans tended to be neutral and demonstrated no
difference in responding to fake news of both their
favored candidate and the rival. In contrast with the
political symmetry as reported by Ditto et al. (2019),
this research instead supports the political asymmetry
perspective, whereby the opposition supporters are more
likely to demonstrate selective exposure by trusting fake
news about their political enemy compared to the
incumbent supporter group.
Trust in fake news that discredits the incumbent rather
than the opposition might also be investigated by
considering the characteristics of partisans. Pro-opposition
participants dominated by alliances with conservative
ideology (Mietzner, 2015) are suspected to have
influenced their tendency to trust fake news content.
Research by Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler (2018) showed
that individuals who tended to be conservative and proPresident Trump in the United States were more likely to
visit fake news websites. Faris, Roberts, Etling, Bourassa,
Zuckerman, and Benkler (2018) also found that
disinformation news driven by political clickbait had
become a prominent issue and had been exaggerated
more in conservative media than in progressive media.
Bronstein, Pennycook, Bear, Rand, and Cannon (2018)
reported that religious fundamentalists and dogmatic
followers are more likely to trust fake news and are less
sensitive to the need to distinguish fake news from real
news (i.e., media truth discernment). Dogmatic and
ideologically extreme (as opposed to moderate) people
tend to share simplistic, certainty-oriented cognitive
styles (Sterling, Jost, & Pennycook, 2016) and are less
open-minded (Bronstein et al., 2018). A study by
Yilmaz and Saribay (2017) indicates that conservatism
(whether social, economic, or general) supporters tend
to show low trait reflectiveness.
Research by Amanullah and Dwisusilo (2018) can also
be used to explain political asymmetry in fake news
content. Considering the number of followers and
content in the Facebook group of Jokowi (incumbent)
and Prabowo (opposition) supporters, opposition
supporters are more prone to the echo-chamber effect
than their counterparts. This indicates that opposition
Makara Hubs-Asia
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supporters are more vulnerable to the post-truth
phenomenon compared to incumbent supporters
(Amanullah & Dwisusilo, 2018). The most frequent
content found in the opposition-supporting Facebook
group (i.e., Prabowo for NKRI) are negative comments,
mockery, and hate speech directed toward the incumbent
(Amanullah & Dwisusilo, 2018). Such content reached
91 items (33%). It is different from the incumbentsupporting Facebook group (i.e., Loyalis Jokowi-Ahok
group), where the majority of content produced by
the supporters is propaganda/campaign/defense on
Jokowi/PDI-P/supporters/their families, programs, and
policies, reaching 105 counts of total content (41%).
Negative comments, mockery, hate speech, and negative
campaigning toward Prabowo and his supporters take up
only 21% of the total posts.
This research found no notable correlation between
general critical thinking ability and the tendency to trust
and to spread fake news content in both groups. It is
also supported by the finding that indicates a relatively
similar level of critical thinking ability among the two
sides, but they have different proclivities for selective
exposure to fake news content. It seems to conflict with
the intuitive approach which says that critical thinking is
closely related to debiasing. Kenyon and Beaulac (2014)
said that critical thinking ability is inadequately reliable
to ensure debiasing when an individual makes a decision
or judgment. Further, according to the argumentative
theory, reasoning ability often causes individuals to be
more biased if they have already had a particular
standpoint beforehand (Mercier & Sperber, 2011).
Instead, individuals are capable of bolstering their
opinion using the reasoning ability they have, by which
they will seek out justification of their opinion, rather
than minimize their bias (Mercier & Sperber, 2011).
One important thing to keep in mind is that the
instrument constructed by Fajrianthi et al. (2016), which
was used in this research, is designed to measure the
degree to which an individual has the analytical ability
to draw conclusions, recognize assumptions, think
deductively, interpret information, and evaluate the
strength and relevance of arguments. The critical point
of debiasing is not merely how individuals can recall
their ability to think analytically in drawing a conclusion,
but also on their perspective-taking ability. An
experiment by Todd et al. (2011; 2012) demonstrates
that perspective-taking can change implicit bias by
increasing psychological interconnectedness between
the self and target perspective-taking. Therefore, it takes
not only the ability to think analytically, but also the
ability to detach from one’s own perspective and see
things from a different perspective. This was termed as
critical open-mindedness by Lambie (2014). Future
researchers are expected to investigate open-minded
thinking ability in terms of its role in reducing bias
toward media content.
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In relation to the second research question, it was found
that regardless of their political allegiances, almost all
respondents did not browse the provided links of the
fake news. This could be due to a number of possibilities:
1) respondents have already had an intuitive and/or a
rational tendency pertaining to which content they feel
they can trust and which they cannot, without browsing
the source of the news; 2) Paper-based survey might not
make it easy for respondents to trace the news source,
far less to do fact-checking, and using their own
smartphone to do so might be seen as time-consuming.
Research by Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler (2018) actually
shows that only 14% of internet user partisans in the
United States do fact-checking. However, the findings
of this experiment are not strong enough to be
interpreted more generally due to the limitation in the
research design. Future research should consider the
ease for respondents of tracing news sources and factchecking.

find out how pronounced the bias tendency is, whether
an individual is inclined to do fact-checking and browsing
the source of information in order to reduce cognitive
dissonance, especially when they get negative news
concerning the candidate they support. Future research
should really take into account the employment of
practical design, so that it can reveal the bias tendency in
fact-checking, as well as investigate intuitive and
rational tendency when one does it.

5. Conclusion

This paper was prepared as part of the mini-symposium
on Youth and Media in January 2019 in Jakarta.

This research shows that the opposition group is more
inclined to conduct selective exposure than the incumbent
group. Selective exposure is manifested in the opposition
side’s tendency to trust news that discredits their
political enemy and demonstrates the contrary response
to news which defames the candidate they support. Also
salient is the opposition group’s higher tendency to share
fake news concerning their political opponent than to
those items regarding their favored candidate.
There are some limitations and potential criticisms of
this study. The first pertains to the sample, both the
small sample size and the sample recruitment through
the snowballing method. Both objections make
comparisons between the two groups displaying a lack
of generalizability if a national-scale conclusion is to
be made. However, participant recruitment from one
population unit is regarded as adequate in describing
the inferential relation between critical thinking and
selective exposure tendency.
The second potential criticism is related to the usage of
the critical thinking test. The critical thinking measuring
instrument constructed by an Indonesian researcher is
initially expected to minimize cultural bias, so it can
truly reveal the critical-analytical thinking ability of
Indonesian partisans. However, in this research, the test
created by Fajrianthi et al. (2016) is found to have low
internal consistency. Further improvement on this test’s
validity is expected to confirm its predictive power.
The third objection pertains to the experiment design to
observe cognitive bias tendency when one traces the
source of information. The required manipulation is
deemed not practical enough to actually reveal the target
behavior. The initial assumption of this experiment is to
Makara Hubs-Asia
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